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Abstract
In January 1999, the authors published a quantitative prediction that the Nikkei index
should recover from its 14 year low in January 1999 and reach ≈ 20500 a year later. The
purpose of the present paper is to evaluate the performance of this specific prediction as
well as the underlying model: the forecast, performed at a time when the Nikkei was at
its lowest (as we can now judge in hindsight), has correctly captured the change of trend
as well as the quantitative evolution of the Nikkei index since its inception. As the change
of trend from sluggish to recovery was estimated quite unlikely by many observers at that
time, a Bayesian analysis shows that a skeptical (resp. neutral) Bayesian sees her prior
belief in our model amplified into a posterior belief 19 times larger (resp. reach the 95%
level).
keywords: Stock market; Log-periodic oscillations; scale invariance; prediction; Gold;
Nikkei; Herding behaviour.
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Following the general guidelines proposed in [1], the authors made in January 1999 public
through the Los Alamos preprint server [2] a quantitative prediction stating that the Nikkei
index should recover from its 14 year low (actually 13232.74 on 5 Jan 1999) and reach ≈ 20500
a year later corresponding to an increase in the index of ≈ 50%. Furthermore, this prediction
was mentioned in a wide-circulation journal which appeared in May 1999 [3].
Specifically, based on a third-order “Landau” expansion
dF (τ)
d log τ
= αF (τ) + β|F (τ) |2F (τ) + γ|F (τ) |4F (τ) . . . (1)
in terms of τ ≡ t − tc, where tc = 31 Dec. 1989 is the time of the all-time high of the Nikkei
index, the authors arrived at the equation
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describing the time-evolution of the Nikkei Index p(t). Equation (2) was then fitted to the
Nikkei index in the time interval from the beginning of 1990 to the end of 1998, i.e., a total of
9 years. Extending the curve beyond 1998 thus provided us with a quantitative prediction for
the future evolution of the Index. In figure 1, we compare the actual and predicted evolution
of the Nikkei over 1999. We see that not only did the Nikkei experience a trend reversal as
predicted, but it has also followed the quantitative prediction with rather impressive precision,
see figure 2. It is important to note that the error between the curve and the data has not
grown after the last point used in the fit. This tells us that the prediction has performed well
so far. Furthermore, since the relative error between the fit and the data is within ±2% over
a time period of 10 years, not only has the prediction performed well, but also the underlying
model. This analysis represents the correct quantitative evaluation of the performance of the
model as well as its predictive power on the Nikkei Index over a quite impressive time-span of
10 years.
We wish to stress that the fulfilling of our prediction is even more remarkable than the
comparison between the curve and the data indicates. This, since it included a change of trend:
at the time when the prediction was issued, the market was declining and showed no tendency
to increase. Many economists were at that time very pessimistic and could not envision when
Japan and its market would rebounce. For instance, the well-known economist P. Krugman [4]
wrote July 14, 1998 in the Shizuoka Shimbun at the time of the banking scandal “the central
problem with Japan right now is that there just is not enough demand to go around - that
consumers and corporations are saving too much and borrowing too little... So seizing these
banks and putting them under more responsible management is, if anything, going to further
reduce spending; it certainly will not in and of itself stimulate the economy... But at best
this will get the economy back to where it was a year or two ago - that is, depressed, but not
actually plunging.” Then, in the Financial Times, January, 20th, 1999, P. Krugman wrote in
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an article entitled “Japan heads for the edge” the following: “...the story is starting to look
like a tragedy. A great economy, which does not deserve or need to be in a slump at all, is
heading for the edge of the cliff – and its drivers refuse to turn the wheel.” In a poll of thirty
economists performed by Reuters (the major news and finance data provider in the world) in
October 1998 [5], only two economists predicted growth for the fiscal year of 1998-99. For the
year 1999-2000 the prediction was a meager 0.1% growth. This majority of economists said
that “a vicious cycle in the economy was unlikely to disappear any time soon as they expected
little help from the government’s economic stimulus measures... Economists blamed moribund
domestic demand, falling prices, weak capital spending and problems in the bad-loan laden
banking sector for dragging down the economy.”
Nevertheless, we predicted a ≈ 50% increase of the market in the next 12 months assuming
that the Nikkei would stay within the error-bars of the fit. At the time of writing (3rd February
2000), the market is up by ≈ 49.5% and the error between the prediction and the curve has
not increased, see figure 2. Predictions of trend reversals is noteworthy difficult and unreliable,
especially in the linear framework of auto-regressive models used in standard economic analyses.
The present nonlinear framework is well-adapted to the forecasting of change of trends, which
constitutes by far the most difficult challenge posed to forecasters. Here, we refer to our
prediction of a trend reversal within the strict confine of equation (2): trends are limited
periods of times when the oscillatory behavior shown in figure 1 is monotonous. A change of
trend thus corresponds to crossing a local maximum or minimum of the oscillations.
We report one case. In the standard “frequentist” approach to probability [6] and to the
establishment of statistical confidence, this bears essentially no weight and should be discarded
as story telling. We are convinced that the “frequentist” approach is unsuitable to assess the
quality of such a unique experiment as presented here of the prediction of a global financial
indicator and that the correct framework is Bayesian. Within the Bayesian framework, the
probability that the hypothesis is correct given the data can be estimated, whereas this is
excluded by construction in the standard “frequentist” formulation, in which one can only
calculate the probability that the null-hypothesis is wrong, not that the alternative hypothesis
is correct (see also [7] for recent introductory discussions).
Bayes’ theorem states that
P (Hi|D) =
P (D|Hi)× P (Hi)∑
j P (D|Hj)P (Dj)
. (3)
where the sum in the denominator runs over all the different conflicting hypothesis. In words,
equation (3) estimates that the probability, that hypothesis Hi is correct given the data D, is
proportional to the probability P (D|Hi) of the data given the hypothesis Hi multiplied with
the prior belief P (Hi) in the hypothesis Hi divided with the probability of the data. In the
present context, we use only the two hypotheses H1 and H2 that our prediction of a trend
reversal is correct or that it is wrong. For the data, we take the change of trend from bearish
to bullish. We now want to estimate whether the fulfillment of our prediction was a “lucky
one”. We quantify the general atmosphere of disbelief that Japan would recover by the value
P (D|H2) = 5% for the probability that the Nikkei will change trend while disbelieving our
model. We assign the classical confidence level of P (D|H1) = 95% for the probability that the
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Nikkei will change trend while believing our model.
Let us consider a skeptical Bayesian with prior probability (or belief) P (H1) = 10
−n, n ≥ 1
that our model is correct. From (3), we get
P (H1|D) =
0.95× 10−n
0.95 · 10−n + 0.05× (1− 10−n)
. (4)
For n = 1, we see that her posterior belief in our model has been amplified compared to her
prior belief by a factor ≈ 7 corresponding to P (H1|D) ≈ 70%. For n = 2, the amplification
factor is ≈ 16 and hence P (H1|D) ≈ 16%. For large n (very skeptical Bayesian), we see that
her posterior belief in our model has been amplified compared to her prior belief by a factor
0.95/0.05 = 19. Alternatively, consider a neutral Bayesian with prior belief P (H1) = 1/2, i.e.,
a priori she considers equally likely that our model is correct or wrong. In this case, her prior
belief is changed into the posterior belief equal to
P (H1|D) =
0.95 · 1
2
0.95 · 1
2
+ 0.05 · 1
2
= 95% . (5)
This means that this single case is enough to convince the neutral Bayesian.
We stress that this specific application of Bayes’ theorem only deals with a small part of
the model, i.e., the trend reversal. It does not establish the significance of the quantitative
description of 10 years of data (of which the last one was unknown at the time of the prediction)
by the proposed model within a relative error of ≈ ±2%.
A question that remains is how far into the future will the Japanese stock market continue
to follow equation (2)? Obviously, the Nikkei Index must “break away” at some point in the
future even if there are no changes in the overall behaviour and the underlying model thus
remains valid. The reason is that the prediction was made using a third order expansion.
This means that, as the parameter τ = t − tc in equation (2) continues to increase, this
approximation becomes worse and worse and a fourth order term should be included. Presently,
we are not ready to present the derivation of such an equation. Furthermore, we expect the
numerical difficulties involved in fitting an even more complex equation than equation (2) to
be considerable.
Last, we would like to bring to the attention of the reader that not only can bearish markets
occasionally be described by the framework underlying equation (2). In fact, bullish markets
exhibits such changes of regimes even more frequently, see [8].
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Figure 1: . Logarithm of the Nikkei Index compared to equation 2. The dots are the data used
in the fit of equation (2) being the ticked line and covers the 9 year period from 31 Dec. 1989
to 31 Dec. 1998. The solid line is the actual behaviour of the Nikkei after the last point used
in the fit and covers the period 1 Jan. 1999 to 28 Jan. 2000. The prediction was made public
on the 25 Jan. 1999 [2]. See [2] for details of the fit.
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Figure 2: The relative error between the fit with equation (2) and the data. The ticked line
if the relative error between the fit and the data used in the fit. The solid line is the error
between the prediction and the actual data.
5
